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a b s t r a c t
Little attention has been paid to the importance of the relationship between therapeutic jurisprudence
(TJ) and the role of criminal defense lawyers in insanity and incompetency-to-stand-trial (IST) cases. That
inattention is especially noteworthy in light of the dismal track record of counsel providing services to
defendants who are part of this cohort of incompetency-status-raisers and insanity-defense-pleaders. On
one hand, this lack of attention is a surprise as TJ scholars have, in recent years, turned their attention to
virtually every other aspect of the legal system. On the other hand, it is not a surprise, given the
omnipresence of sanism, an irrational prejudice of the same quality and character of other irrational
prejudices that cause (and are reﬂected in) prevailing social attitudes of racism, sexism, homophobia, and
ethnic bigotry, that infects both our jurisprudence and our lawyering practices. Sanism is largely invisible
and largely socially acceptable, and is based predominantly upon stereotype, myth, superstition, and
deindividualization. It is sustained and perpetuated by our use of alleged “ordinary common sense” (OCS)
and heuristic reasoning in an unconscious response to events both in everyday life and in the legal
process.
This paper examines the literature that seeks to apply TJ principles to the criminal law process in general,
drawing mostly on the work of Professor David Wexler. It considers why the lack of attention that I have
referred to already is surprising (given TJ's mandate and the fact that many TJ issues are inevitably raised
in any insanity or IST case). The paper then considers why this lack of attention is not surprising, given the
omnipresence of sanism. It will consider some of the actual counseling issues that might arise in these
contexts, and offer some suggestions to lawyers representing clients in cases in which mental status
issues may be raised. The paper concludes that we must rigorously apply therapeutic jurisprudence
principles to these issues, so as to strip away sanist behavior, pretextual reasoning and teleological
decision making from the criminal competency and responsibility processes, so as to enable us to
confront the pretextual use of social science data in an open and meaningful way. This gambit would also
allow us to address—in a more successful way than has ever yet been done—the problems raised by the
omnipresence of ineffective counsel in cases involving defendants with mental disabilities.
© 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction⁎
Notwithstanding the fact that therapeutic jurisprudence (“TJ”) has
expanded its vision far beyond its original focus on mental disability
law issues,1 and notwithstanding the fact that judges and scholars
E-mail address: mperlin@nyls.edu.
Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the European Association of
Psychology and Law meeting (University of Liverpool, June 2006), at the AmericanPsychology Law Society meeting (Jacksonville, FL, March 2008), and at the
International Conference on Justice and Policing in Diverse Societies/International
Network on Therapeutic Jurisprudence Conference (San Juan, PR, June 2008). Revised:
August 18, 2009 and November 13, 2009
1
See e.g., PRACTICING THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: LAW AS A HELPING PROFESSION (Dennis P. Stolle
et al. eds., 2000) (“PTJ”); JUDGING IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY: THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE AND THE
COURTS (Bruce J. Winick & David B. Wexler eds., 2003) (“JTK”).

have eagerly embraced TJ concepts and values in matters involving a
wide array of legal issues,2 little attention has been paid to the
importance of the relationship between TJ and the role of criminal
defense lawyers in insanity and incompetency-to-stand-trial (“IST”)
cases.3 Although David Wexler, one of the founders of TJ, has recently
turned his attention to an important set of criminal-law based

⁎

0160-2527/$ – see front matter © 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.ijlp.2010.09.017

2

See e.g., http://www.law.arizona.edu/depts/upr-intj/ (Cumulative bibliography).
I have considered the relationship between TJ and the insanity defense in MICHAEL L.
PERLIN, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE 417-38 (1994), but did not focus on the
lawyering issues in that context. See infra Part III and IV B.
3
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questions,4 the speciﬁc subset of insanity and IST cases has not drawn
any recent commentary.
This lack of attention is signiﬁcant, and it is both surprising and not
surprising. It is important because, as I will discuss at greater length, the
trial record of defense counsel representing criminal defendants with
mental disabilities in general is abysmal.5 In 1973, Judge David Bazelon
referred to certain appointed criminal defense lawyers as “walking
violations of the Sixth Amendment”6; there is not a shred of evidence
that suggests that quality of counsel in insanity or IST cases has improved
in any signiﬁcant way.7 It is surprising because, as I have already noted, TJ
scholars have begun to exhaustively consider (virtually) all aspects of
substantive law, of the judging of cases, and of the roles of lawyers in
representing clients (thus making this speciﬁc omission even more
glaring). But, on the other hand, it is not surprising because of the
omnipresence of sanism—an irrational prejudice of the same quality and
character of other irrational prejudices that cause, and are reﬂected in,
prevailing social attitudes of racism, sexism, homophobia, and ethnic
bigotry in all aspects of the criminal justice system. 8 And it is not a
surprise that this all-pervasive sanism may be at its most pernicious in
this subset of cases: ones that involve the representation of the “most
despised and most morally repugnant” group of individuals in society,9
and the type of case that is perhaps the most misunderstood by the
general public (and by the legal system as well).10
The issue of ineffectiveness of counsel becomes especially pointed
when a defendant's trial competency status is raised or when the
insanity defense is pled. Confounding the process in these cases is the
dispositional phase, since virtually all of these defendants are institutionalized for longer times—often, far longer times—than had they pled
or been found guilty of the underlying charge.11 This phenomenon
persists despite United States Supreme Court decisions that ostensibly
limit the amount of time defendants can be detained when they are
deemed unlikely to attain competency in the foreseeable future.12 All of
this suggests to me that this should be an area of great interest to TJ
scholars; I hope this paper spurs some interest in it. Here, I will speculate
4

See

DAVID B. WEXLER, REHABILITATING LAWYERS: PRINCIPLES OF THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE FOR

CRIMINAL LAW PRACTICE (2008); David B. Wexler, A Tripartite Framework for Incorporating
Therapeutic Jurisprudence in Criminal Law, Research, and Practice, 7 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 95
(2005) (Wexler, Framework); David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the
Rehabilitative Role of the Criminal Defense Lawyer, 17 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 743 (2005)
(Wexler, Rehabilitative Role); David B. Wexler, Some Reﬂections on Therapeutic
Jurisprudence and the Practice of Criminal Law, 38 CRIM. L. BULL. 205 (2002); The most
important and recent critique of Prof. Wexler's approach to these questions, see Mae C.
Quinn, An RSVP to Professor Wexler's Warm Therapeutic Jurisprudence Invitation to the
Criminal Defense Bar: Unable To Join You, Already (Somewhat Similarly) Engaged, 48 B.C.L.
REV. 539 (2007), does not touch on these issues. For Prof. Wexler's response to Prof.
Quinn, see David B. Wexler, Not Such a Party Pooper: An Attempt to Accommodate (Many
of) Professor Quinn's Concerns About Therapeutic Jurisprudence Criminal Defense
Lawyering, 48 B.C.L. REV.597 (2007) (Wexler, Not a Party Pooper). Again, this topic is
not discussed in that article either.
5
See Michael L. Perlin, “Life Is In Mirrors, Death Disappears: Giving Life to Atkins”, 33 N.
MEX. L. REV. 315, 335 (2003) (“The quality of counsel in providing legal representation to
mentally disabled criminal defendants is a disgrace”).
6
David L. Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 2 (1973).
7
For earlier considerations, see e.g., Michael L. Perlin, Fatal Assumption: A Critical
Evaluation of the Role of Counsel in Mental Disability Cases, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 39, 58–
59; Ingo Keilitz, Researching and Reforming the Insanity Defense, 39 RUTGERS L. REV. 47
(1987); Henry J. Steadman, Mental Health Law and the Criminal Offender: Research
Directions of the 1990's, 39 RUTGERS L. REV. 323 (1987).
8
See e.g., Michael L. Perlin, “And My Best Friend, My Doctor/Won't Even Say What It Is
I've Got”: The Role and Signiﬁcance of Counsel in Right to Refuse Treatment Cases, 42 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 735, 750 (2005). See generally text infra accompanying notes 45–47.
9
See Deborah C. Scott et al., Monitoring Insanity Acquittees: Connecticut's Psychiatric
Security Review Board, 41 HOSP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 980, 982 (1990); Michael L.
Perlin, “The Borderline Which Separated You From Me”: The Insanity Defense, the
Authoritarian Spirit, the Fear of Faking, and the Culture of Punishment, 82 IOWA L. REV.
1375, 1379 (1997).
10
See generally, PERLIN, supra note 3.
11
See e.g., Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983).
12
See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972); See generally, Michael L. Perlin, “Everything's
a Little Upside Down, As a Matter of Fact the Wheels Have Stopped” : The Fraudulence of the
Incompetency Evaluation Process, 4 HOUSTON J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 239 (2004).

as to the reasons for this comparative lack of emphasis, and will offer
some ideas that I believe are worthy of future scholarly consideration in
this area.
In Part 2 of this paper, I will examine the literature that seeks to
apply TJ principles to the criminal law process in general, drawing
mostly on the work of Professor David Wexler. In Part 3, I will consider
why the lack of attention that I have referred to already is surprising
(given TJ's mandate and the fact that many TJ issues are inevitably
raised in any insanity or IST case). In Part 4, I will then consider why
this lack of attention is not surprising, given the omnipresence of
sanism. In Part 5, I will consider some of the actual counseling issues
that might arise in these contexts, and offer some suggestions to
lawyers representing clients in cases in which mental status issues
may be raised. I will then, in Part 6, offer some modest conclusions.
The title of this paper comes, in part, from Bob Dylan's brooding
and reﬂective song, Up To Me, an outtake from Blood on the Tracks, and
subsequently released on Biograph some eleven years after it was ﬁrst
recorded. The verse from which it comes includes these lines:
I was just too stubborn to ever be governed by enforced insanity,
Someone had to reach for the risin' star,
I guess it was up to me.13
The lyric suggests that even after the imposition of non-responsibility
(“enforced insanity”), the protagonist retains some important measure
of responsibility (“I guess it was up to me“). As I will discuss
subsequently, this is also an issue that arises in cases in which the
attorney may enter a plea of NGRI (not guilty by reason of insanity) for a
client who is unaware of the implications of that plea, a topic certainly
within purview of a TJ analysis. This lyric, thus, I think, is perfectly
appropriate for use in this paper.
2. TJ and the criminal law
In a recent article, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Rehabilitative Role
of the Criminal Defense Lawyer, Prof. David Wexler one of the fathers of
the TJ movement, sets out a blueprint for criminal defense lawyers who
want to embrace TJ in their practice:
In the present article, I will identify the potential rehabilitative role of
the attorney from the beginning stages—possible diversion, for
example—through sentencing and even beyond—through conditional or unconditional release, and possible efforts to expunge the
criminal record. This article has two principal purposes; ﬁrst, to call
for the explicit recognition of a TJ criminal lawyer, and to provide, in a
very sketchy manner, an overview of that role; second, to propose an
agenda of research and teaching to foster the development of the
rehabilitative role of the criminal lawyer.14
Although Wexler concedes that “the legal profession alone cannot
solve the problem of criminality or rehabilitate persons involved in
the criminal justice system,” he argues that, nonetheless, “criminal
lawyers can make a dent, salvage some lives, work with other
professionals and advocate for services and changes in policy.”15
To this end, he surveys the literature on how criminal defense
lawyers can act as “change agents” by developing relationships with
their clients premised on trust and respect,16 and by engaging in
what is called “motivational lawyering.”17 Subsequently, when
13

http://www.bobdylan.com/#/songs/me (Last accessed, August 8, 2009).
Wexler, Rehabilitative Role, supra note 4, at 745.
15
Id. at 745, n. 12.
16
Id. at 748, citing Michael D. Clark, A Change-Focused Approach for Judges, in JTK,
supra note 1, at 137–148; see also Marcus T. Boccaccini et al., Development and Effects of
Client Trust in Criminal Defense Attorneys: Preliminary Examination of the Congruence
Model of Trust Development, 22 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 197 (2004).
17
Id. at 748, citing Astrid Birgden, Dealing with the Resistant Criminal Client: A
Psychologically-Minded Strategy for More Effective Legal Counseling, 38 CRIM. L. BULL. 225 (2002).
14
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Wexler moves on to a discussion of plea and sentencing considerations,18 he argues “a genuine acceptance of responsibility—especially
if coupled with an apology—is generally regarded as therapeutically
welcome by the victim and as a good ﬁrst rehabilitative step for the
defendant.”19 As I will discuss shortly, this insight (one that appears
to apply to much of the criminal law process) does not appear, at ﬁrst
blush, to be one that will have much of an impact on the cases that I
am discussing in this paper: cases involving defendants who plead
insanity or defendants on whose behalf the incompetency status is
raised.20

3. It's a surprise
Scholars have begun to apply TJ concepts to practically every
question of interest to the legal system, especially in the context of
persons with mental disabilities. As I noted in an article that I wrote
ten years ago:
Recent therapeutic jurisprudence articles and essays have thus
considered such matters as the insanity acquittee conditional
release hearing, health care of mentally disabled prisoners, the
psychotherapist–patient privilege, incompetency labeling, competency decision-making, juror decision-making in malpractice
and negligent release litigation, competency to consent to
treatment, competency to seek voluntary treatment, standards
of psychotherapeutic tort liability, the effect of guilty pleas in sex
offender cases, correctional law, health care delivery, “repressed
memory” litigation, the impact of scientiﬁc discovery on substantive criminal law doctrine, and the competency to be
executed.21
Importantly, scholars have also begun to consider the relationship
between TJ and the actual act of lawyering22 and the act of judging.23
Yet, astonishingly, notwithstanding, the “rivers of ink, mountains of
printer's lead, [and] forests of paper [that] have been expended on
[debating the insanity defense],”24 and notwithstanding the numer-

18
See also, on this point, Bruce Winick, Redeﬁning the Role of the Criminal Defense
Lawyer at Plea Bargaining and Sentencing: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence/Preventive Law
Model, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 1034 (1999).
19
Wexler, Rehabilitative Role, supra note 4, at 754, citing, inter alia, Stephanos Bibas &
Richard A. Bierschbach, Integrating Remorse and Apology into Criminal Procedure, 114 YALE L.J.
85 (2004).
20
The invocation of the incompetency status is in no way an admission of factual
guilt, though it is often treated that way. See Perlin, supra note 12, at 245, discussed
infra note 34.
21
Michael L. Perlin, For the Misdemeanor Outlaw: The Impact of the ADA on the
Institutionalization of Criminal Defendants with Mental Disabilities, 52 ALABAMA L. REV. 193,
228 (2000) (Perlin, Outlaw); see also, 1 MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL AND
CRIMINAL § 2D-3, at 536–38 (2d ed. 1998). On the application of TJ principles to other
areas of the law, see e.g., Michael L. Perlin, A Law of Healing, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 407, 408
(2000) (discussing TJ's use in such areas as jury reform, workers' compensation,
domestic violence, and labor arbitration).
22
See e.g., Bruce J. Winick, Using Therapeutic Jurisprudence in Teaching Lawyering
Skills, 17 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 429 (2005); Susan Daicoff, Law as a Healing Profession: The
Comprehensive Law Movement, 6 PEPP. J. DISP. RESOL. 1 (2006); Dennis P. Stolle, et al.,
Integrating Preventive Law and Therapeutic Jurisprudence: A Law and Psychology Based
Approach to Lawyering, 34 CAL. W. L. REV. 15 (1997); Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic
Jurisprudence and the Role of Counsel in Litigation, 37 CAL. W. L. REV. 105, 108 (2000); see
generally, PTJ, supra note 1. Professor Winick has also written extensively and superbly
about the relationship between TJ and the incompetency to stand trial process in
general, but has not focused on the speciﬁc counsel-related issues that are at the heart
of this paper. See e. g., Bruce J. Winick, Reforming Incompetency to Stand Trial and Plead
Guilty: A Restated Proposal and a Response to Professor Bonnie, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
571 (1995); Bruce J. Winick, Presumptions and Burdens of Proof in Determining
Competency to Stand Trial: An Analysis of Medina v. California and the Supreme Court's
New Due Process Methodology in Criminal Cases, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 817 (1993).
23
See JTK, supra note 1.
24
Norval Morris, Psychiatry and the Dangerous Criminal, 41 S. CAL. L. REV. 514, 516
(1968).
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ical signiﬁcance of the incompetency status,25 this question has not
been discussed at length in the legal literature.26
4. It's not a surprise
In 1994, in a book-length treatment of the insanity defense, I urged
policy makers “to weigh the therapeutic potential of the different policy
choices that are presented at each of [the] points” of the insanity defense
system in order to make that system “coherent.”27 In the course of the
sub-chapter that I devoted to this question, I considered a range of
insanity defense policy issues:
•
•
•
•

Is a non-responsibility verdict therapeutic?
Does the substantive standard matter?
Do procedural rules matter?
Should post-acquittal commitment procedures track the traditional
involuntary civil commitment model, or is a separate, more
restrictive means of determining commitment appropriate?
• Once institutionalized, how should insanity acquittees be treated?, and
• How should insanity acquittees be monitored in community settings?28
I was not the ﬁrst to consider some of these questions,29 but again,
neither my previous work nor the work of others have dealt with the
questions I am raising here. Interestingly, at the end of the book
subchapter to which I just referred, I listed other possible questions
that were beyond the scope of that work. One of them was “the
systemic ways that counsel is assigned to potential insanity
pleaders.”30 In the footnote in which I raise that issue, I touch on
the topic of this paper (some 16 years later). This is what I wrote then:
“Lawyers representing [mentally disabled criminal defendants] often
ignore potential mental status defenses, or, in some cases, contradictorily, seek to have the insanity defense imposed on their client over
his objections. Such lawyers often succumb to sanist stereotypes and
are compliant co-conspirators in pretextual court decisions.”31
The following examples represent some of the TJ related-issues
raised by cases involving criminal defendants pleading the insanity
defense or for whom the incompetency status has been raised:
– if a defendant is, in fact, incompetent to stand trial, that means that
he does not have “sufﬁcient present ability to consult with his lawyer
with a reasonable degree of rational understanding” and or a
“rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against
him;”32 how can TJ principles be invoked in such a case?
25
Twenty years ago, it was estimated that there were 25,000 evaluations per year.
See Bruce Winick, Incompetency to Stand Trial: An Assessment of Costs and Beneﬁts, and a
Proposal for Reform, 39 RUTGERS L. REV. 243, 245 (1987).
26
For a rare example of a discussion of a collateral issue, see Sandy Meng Shan Liu,
Postpartum Psychosis: A Legitimate Defense for Negating Criminal Responsibility?, 4
SCHOLAR 339, 375–76 (2002):
In cases of infanticide, the concept of diminished capacity avoids a claim of insanity
and potentially reduces charges of murder to manslaughter, resulting in rehabilitative
conﬁnement rather than penal incarceration. This result most closely ﬁts the rubric of
therapeutic jurisprudence by making a legal judgment with an awareness of mental
health implications, sentencing difﬁculties, and the offenders' rehabilitation needs.
27
PERLIN, supra note 3, at 419.
28
Id. at 429–36. I then noted that there remained a “menu” of other issues that
needed to be considered from a TJ perspective: “the procedural due process
requirements needed at the recommitment process, the right of defendants to refuse
to enter an insanity plea, the impact of a failed insanity plea on a subsequent sentence,
the impact of a successful plea on other legal statutes, and the systemic ways that
counsel is assigned to potential insanity pleaders.” Id. at 436–37.
29
See e.g., David Wexler, Health Care Compliance Principles and the Insanity Acquittee
Conditional Release Process, 27 CRIM. L. BULL. 18 (1991); Robert A. Fein, How the Insanity
Acquittal Retards Treatment, in THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: THE LAW AS A THERAPEUTIC AGENT 49,
52–55 (David Wexler ed. 1990); Bruce J. Winick, Ambiguities in the Legal Meaning and
Signiﬁcance of Mental Illness, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL. & L. 534 (1995).
30
PERLIN, supra note 3, at 437.
31
Id. at 437 n. 106, citing, in part, Michael L. Perlin, On “Sanism”, 46 SMU L. REV. 373,
404–06 (1992).
32
Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960). See Perlin, Outlaw, supra note 21,
at 200 (criticizing Dusky as “confusing and less than helpful”).
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– If a defendant is initially found to be incompetent to stand trial,
will the lawyer act as most lawyers and consider him to be de
facto incompetent for the entire proceeding (as a signiﬁcant
percentage of lawyers do act for any client who is institutionalized)?33
– If a defendant is found to be incompetent to stand trial, will the
lawyer assume that he is also guilty of the underlying criminal
charge?34
– What are the issues that a lawyer must consider in addition to the
client's mental state in assessing whether or not to invoke an
incompetency determination?35
– What are the TJ implications for a case in which the incompetency
status is not raised by the defendant, but, rather, by the prosecutor or
the judge?36
– Are there times when TJ principles might mandate not raising
the incompetency status (for example, in a case in which the
maximum sentence to which the defendant is exposed is six
months in a county workhouse but is in a jurisdiction in which IST
defendants are regularly housed in maximum security forensic
facilities for far longer periods of time than the maximum to
which they could be sentenced)?37
– What are the TJ implications of counseling a defendant to plead, or
not to plead, the insanity defense?38
– Can a defendant who pleads NGRI ever, truly, “take responsibility?”39
– Does the fact that the insanity-pleading defendant must concede
that he committed the actus reus distort the ongoing lawyer–client
relationship?40
– To what extent do the ample bodies of case law construing
the “ineffectiveness assistance of counsel” standard established

33
See Michael L. Perlin, You Have Discussed Lepers and Crooks: Sanism in Clinical
Teaching, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 683, 696–97 (2003) (these lawyers treat their clients as
“patients that are sick,” quoting BRUCE ARRIGO, PUNISHING THE MENTALLY ILL: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS
OF LAW AND PSYCHIATRY 29–30 (2002)).
34
See Perlin, supra note 12, at 246:
First, the entire system—implicitly and explicitly—assumes that the defendant
committed the predicate criminal act with which he is charged. Although there is
nothing in the invocation of the incompetency status that at all concedes factual
guilt (as opposed to the entry of a not-guilty-by-reason-of-insanity plea that
concedes the commission of the underlying criminal act), it is assumed by all that
the defendant did, in fact, commit the crime.
And see Perlin, Outlaw, supra note 21, at 206–07:
Consider this easy hypothetical. A defendant is charged with crime and is, in fact,
factually innocent. Walking to the courthouse for the initial bail hearing, he is hit
on the head by a cinder block from ongoing courthouse construction, causing
severe organic brain damage. He will be found—most likely—incompetent to stand
trial, but such ﬁnding in no way should allow us to assume that he is factually
“guilty” of the underlying charge.
35
See e.g., Paul A. Chernoff & William G. Schaffer, Defending the Mentally Ill: Ethical
Quicksand, 10 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 505 (1972); Christopher Slobogin & Amy Mashburn, The
Criminal Defense Lawyer's Fiduciary Duty to Clients with Mental Disability, 68 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1581 (2000).
36
See Perlin, Outlaw, supra note 21, at 198 n. 33: “Also, unlike other criminal pleas, [the
incompetency status] can be raised sua sponte by the court or the prosecutor.” See Drope v.
Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975); 18 U.S.C. § 4241 (a) (1994); Hamm v. Jabe, 706 F.2d 765, 767
(6th Cir. 1983); United States v. Warren, 984 F.2d 325, 329 (9th Cir. 1993).
37
See generally, Perlin, Outlaw, supra note 21, at 201-07. I pose a variant on this
question in MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 753 (2d ed. 2005).
38
See e.g., Richard J. Bonnie et al., Decision-Making in Criminal Defense: An Empirical Study of
Insanity Pleas and the Impact of Doubted Client Competence, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 48 (1996).
39
See Michael L. Perlin & Keri K. Gould, Rashomon and the Criminal Law: Mental
Disability and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 22 AM. J. CRIM. L. 431, 449 (1995):
The entry of the insanity plea has been seen as evidence of a failure to demonstrate
contrition (presumably because the plea entry denied legal responsibility for the
offense), and that lack of contrition has been seen as a failure to accept responsibility,
thus bringing the defendant out of the ambit of another Guideline ... which provides for
a downward departure if the defendant “clearly demonstrates a recognition and
afﬁrmative acceptance of personal responsibility for his criminal conduct.”
40
See Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 363 (1983) (“a verdict of not guilty by
reason of insanity establishes two facts: (i) the defendant committed an act that
constitutes a criminal offense, and (ii) he committed the act because of mental
illness.”).

by the US Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington41 even
consider the implications of TJ lawyering?42
– To what extent does the pervasiveness of sanism make it
obligatory for lawyers in such cases to educate jurors about both
sanism and why sanism may be driving their decision-making,
and to what extent should lawyers in such cases embark on this
educational process using TJ principles?43
This is a modest list, but I believe it to be a reasonable starting
point.
Having said this, a more important question is raised: why is this
the ﬁrst time, to the best of my knowledge, that any academic has
addressed this precise issue? Such questions are nearly impossible to
answer, but I believe that a partial explanation for this may be found
in what I have already referred to as “sanism.”44
Again, sanism is an irrational prejudice of the same quality and
character of other irrational prejudices that cause (and are reﬂected in)
prevailing social attitudes of racism, sexism, homophobia, and ethnic
bigotry. It infects both our jurisprudence and our lawyering practices.45
Sanism is largely invisible and largely socially acceptable. It is based
predominantly upon stereotype, myth, superstition, and deindividualization, and is sustained and perpetuated by our use of alleged “ordinary
common sense” (OCS)46 and heuristic reasoning in an unconscious
response to events both in everyday life and in the legal process.47
Some eight years ago, I articulated this perspective on sanism and
the incompetency-to-stand-trial process:
Sanism similarly infects incompetency-to-stand-trial jurisprudence
in at least four critical ways: (1) courts resolutely adhere to the
conviction that defendants regularly malinger and feign incompetency; (2) courts stubbornly refuse to understand the distinction
between incompetency to stand trial and insanity, even though the
41
466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984) (“whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper
function of the adversarial process that the trial court cannot be relied on as having
produced a just result”).
42
See 4 PERLIN, supra note 21, § 8A-4.3, at 60–65 (adequacy of counsel in IST
proceedings), and § 9A-7, at 235–41 (adequacy of counsel in insanity cases); § 12-3.6,
at 505–10 (adequacy of counsel in death penalty cases involving defendants with
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DAME J.L., ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 239, 242–42(1994); see also, Perlin, supra note 5, at 335,
quoting Denis Keyes et al., Mitigating Mental Retardation in Capital Cases: Finding the
“Invisible” Defendant, 22 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 529, 536 (1998) (stating that
“the defense lawyer must educate the jury about mental retardation, its various
presentations, and the distinct difference between mental retardation and mental
illness”).
44
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and Pretextual Bases of Mental Disability Law, 20 N. ENG. J. CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 369
(1994); Michael L. Perlin, Pretexts and Mental Disability Law: The Case of Competency,
47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 625 (1993) (deﬁning pretextuality as the ways in which courts:
accept (either implicitly or explicitly) testimonial dishonesty and engage similarly
in dishonest (and frequently meretricious) decisionmaking, speciﬁcally where
witnesses, especially expert witnesses, show a high propensity to purposely
distort their testimony in order to achieve desired ends. This pretextuality is
poisonous; it infects all participants in the judicial system, breeds cynicism and
disrespect for the law, demeans participants, and reinforces shoddy lawyering,
blase judging, and, at times, perjurious and/or corrupt testifying).
Michael L. Perlin, She Breaks Just Like a Little Girl: Neonaticide, The Insanity Defense,
and the Irrelevance of Ordinary Common Sense, 10 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 1, 25 (2003)
(Perlin, Neonaticide). On pretextuality in the criminal justice process, see generally,
MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE HIDDEN PREJUDICE: MENTAL DISABILITY ON TRIAL 205–58 (2000).
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See generally, PERLIN, supra note 43, at 21–58; Perlin, supra note 31; Michael L.
Perlin, “Half-Wracked Prejudice Leaped Forth”: Sanism, Pretextuality, and Why and How
Mental Disability Law Developed As It Did, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEG. ISS. 3 (1999).
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OCS is a “powerful unconscious animator of legal decision-making,” Perlin,
Neonaticide, supra note 44, at 25; See Richard K. Sherwin, Dialects and Dominance: A
Study of Rhetorical Fields in the Law of Confessions, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 729, 737 (1988)
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two statuses involve different concepts, different standards, and
different points on the “time line”; (3) courts misunderstand the
relationship between incompetency and subsequent commitment,
and fail to consider the lack of a necessary connection between postdetermination institutionalization and appropriate treatment; and
(4) courts regularly accept patently inadequate expert testimony in
incompetency to stand trial cases.48
Nothing has happened in the intervening years to cause me to
change my mind,49 and these factors help explain the even more
pressing need for lawyers to think about the TJ implications of their
actions.
In addition, over a decade ago, I stated the following about the
relationship between sanism and the insanity defense:
In short, insanity defense jurisprudence is the jurisprudence of
sanism. Like the rest of the criminal trial process, the insanity defense
process is riddled by sanist stereotypes and myths. For example:
– reliance on a ﬁxed vision of popular, concrete, visual images of
craziness;
– an obsessive fear of feigned mental states;
– a presumed absolute linkage between mental illness and
dangerousness; -sanctioning of the death penalty in the case
of mentally retarded defendants, some defendants who are
“substantially mentally impaired,” or defendants who have been
found guilty but mentally ill (GBMI);
– the incessant confusion and conﬂation of substantive mental
status tests, and
– the regularity of sanist appeals by prosecutors in insanity
defense summations, arguing that insanity defenses are easily
faked, that insanity acquittees are often immediately released,
and that expert witnesses are readily duped.50

a criminal case, it is not unreasonable to expect that many lawyers
also impute a blanket incompetency in all aspects of life decisionmaking to such clients (“If he is not competent to stand trial, how can he
be competent to participate in decisionmaking about medication?”).54
Bruce Winick and his colleagues have suggested that, in view of this
reality and in consideration of the negative psychological effects of
incompetency labeling, criminal attorneys can help their clients interpret
that legal label in a way that “minimizes the risk of adverse psychological
consequences”.55 Elsewhere, Winick has urged that “the terminology of
incompetency labels should be redesigned to reﬂect the limited and
context-speciﬁc nature of individuals' impairment.”56 If these recommendations are to be taken seriously by defense counsel, then there may
be some progress made in eroding the level of sanism so often prevalent
in the cases under discussion.
5.2. The implications of an insanity plea
It is no different in insanity cases. Once a defendant argues that
he is criminally not responsible for the underlying act, sanist lawyers
assume he is “crazy” for all purposes and cannot participate
meaningfully in treatment planning or decisionmaking. This approach
ignores the reality that the legal category of “insanity” subsumes
multiple conditions, and that these categories should not be
aggregated unthinkingly by defense counsel. Consider, by way of
gross examples, the defendant whose actions are totally planful (“God
has told me to do this act to save us from the Klingon empire”;“Satan
has ordered me to shoot the 7th girl in a purple sweater I see on a
sunny day”),57 the defendant whose actions are utterly incomprehensible to the lay public except as the result of mental illness (a
category that subsumes many neonaticide cases and other “empathy
outliers”),58 or the defendant whose explanation of his actions is
rendered in what is often called a “word salad”.59
In his article calling for a restructured and limited insanity defense,
Professor Christopher Slobogin argues:

Again, I believe that these factors help explain both why TJ
principles have largely been absent from lawyering in this area of the
law, and the need for the application of these principles.

[M]ental disorder should be relevant to criminal culpability only if it
supports an excusing condition that, under the subjective approach
to criminal liability increasingly accepted today, would be available
to a person who is not mentally ill. The three most prominent such
conditions would be: (1) a mistaken belief about circumstances that,
had they occurred as the person believed, would amount to a legal
justiﬁcation; (2) a mistaken belief that conditions exist that amount
to legally recognized duress; and (3) the absence of intent to commit
crime (that is, the lack of mens rea, deﬁned subjectively in terms of
what the defendant actually knew or was aware of).60

5. How lawyers counsel clients in mental status cases
5.1. The danger of presuming incompetency
One of the likely responses of sanist lawyers in cases such as these
is the trivialization of anything a client might say (as to condition,
desire for treatment, desire to refuse treatment, etc.), presuming that
their clients are incompetent to engage in autonomous decisionmaking about any matter involving treatment, trial strategy, or other
important life decisions.51 This trivialization further infects the
lawyer–client relationship in multiple ways that make it less likely
that the lawyer's counseling role is truly fulﬁlled.52
This is poisonous in both incompetency and in insanity cases.
Lawyers representing individuals with mental disabilities typically
reject the notion that their client may be competent to engage in any
sort of autonomous decisionmaking (often engaging in what I have
characterized, in discussing civil commitment law and representation,
as the not-atypical ‘presumption of incompetency ‘that is all too often
de rigeur in these cases’.53 When the incompetency status is raised in
48
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Although I disagree with Slobogin's ultimate conclusion about the
need to reduce the defense, this categorization underscores the point I
wish to make: our aggregating all types of insanity defenses into one
grouping, our labeling it all as “crazy behavior,” and our subsequent
arbitrary dismissal of anything the defendant might have to say, is
sanist to the core and equally antithetical to the spirit and purpose of
therapeutic jurisprudence.
It is also essential to consider the need for the lawyer to share with
the defendant the likelihood that the assertion of the incompetency
status or the entry of the insanity plea will likely lead to a far lengthier
time of institutionalization than if the defendant is convicted of the
underlying crime.61 I believe that the failure to make this disclosure in
se meets the Strickland v. Washington standard of ineffectiveness of
counsel.62 But beyond this, there is more to consider.

5.3. Some possible conversations
Think of some of the conversations that a TJ-minded defense
lawyer could initiate with clients on whose behalf the incompetency
status is raised,63 or who proffer an insanity defense64:
• “That was you at the time of the crime, but you're better now.”
• “If you are found incompetent to stand trial, that might make it
much easier for some seeking to seize your assets to have you found
incompetent for civil purposes as well. We need to discuss that.”65
• “Let's understand that if we raise the defense, you are likely to hear lots
of testimony about how out of it you were then. But that doesn't mean
you can't control yourself now or later, or understand what conduct is
wrong.”
• “If we succeed on this defense, it will lessen your hospital commitment
if you see yourself as better and in control, and not as continuing to be
ill and irresponsible.”66
• “If we proceed in this manner (and the defense is successful), there
may be an uphill battle for you all the way to convince hospital
authorities that you have a right to ‘have a voice’ in your treatment
regimen. How can we make it most likely that this will happen?”67
61

See supra text accompanying notes 11–12.
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• “Are you aware that, when you plead ‘not guilty by reason of
insanity,’ that you are conceding that you committed the underlying
physical act?”68
This sample is not meant to be exclusive, of course. And this will
not be an easy task.69 But it is a start, I think, of a dialogue that must be
begun if criminal representation in these cases is to be non-sanist and
is to accord with TJ principles, and if the criminal defense lawyer is
ever to become, in David Wexler's words a “change agent.”70
5.3.1. The conversation about drugging
There is another conversation that lawyers and defendants need to
have in these cases, which revolves around the question of medication.
Here is an example of one way a lawyer might approach the matter:
“Let's plan for this. If you do well in treatment, and drugs are likely to
seriously diminish your symptoms, you may be discharged earlier.
So view the treatment at the hospital as an opportunity. Of course,
you may have the right to refuse such medication, but if you choose
to do that, you should understand what the consequences might be
with regard to the ultimate length of your commitment. Also, the
reality is that, even if you do show improvement, judges may be
fearful to release you early because of political pressures. So that's
something else you need to factor in to your decision.”71
While this conversation might be a start (and is certainly better
than nothing), I do not think it is sufﬁcient in all cases. Consider the
complexity of the underlying cluster of legal issues:
• The Supreme Court has made it clear that the most important issue
to be considered in a forced-medication forensic case is the patient's
“litigational status”72: Is he currently incompetent to stand trial? Is
he proffering an insanity defense? Is he currently incompetent to be
executed?73 Unless/until defense counsel grasps this, it is certainly
not unreasonable to predict that counsel will not be sharing with a
client all that the client needs to know before coming to an informed
decision.
• If a currently-incompetent-to-stand-trial defendant seeks to refuse
the imposition of medication while awaiting trial, and assuming he
meets the standards articulated in Sell v. United States,74 his decision
to refuse medication may result in institutionalization in a
maximum security forensic facility for far longer than if he had
68
Jones, 463 U.S. at 363. I discuss the implications of this decision in this context in Perlin,
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69
See Wexler & Winick, supra note 63, at 613, noting that many clients will be
resistant to having such conversations:
But is the client ready to acknowledge the existence of a problem and willing to
participate voluntarily in treatment designed to end it? Not all clients will be.
Some will be plagued with denial, rationalization, or minimization—psychological
defense mechanisms that will make it difﬁcult to acknowledge that they have a
problem or see the appropriateness of engaging in treatment.
70
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been convicted of the underlying crime.75 This is a question that
must be confronted.
• Similarly, the Supreme Court's ruling in Jones v. United States76 makes
it likely that defendants who invoke this right to refuse will remain
institutionalized longer. This is certainly a choice that a defendant may
knowingly make, but he must be provided with this information by
counsel prior to arriving at this decision.
• Lawyers must also come to grips with the implications of the Supreme
Court's decision in Riggins v. Nevada, which held, on fair trial grounds,
that a competent-to-stand-trial defendant had a right to refuse
medication at his trial when he was proffering an insanity defense.77
Riggins focused on the “litigational side-effects” of antipsychotic
drugs, and discussed the possibility that the drug use might have
compromised “the substance of [the defendant's] trial testimony, his
interaction with counsel, [and] his comprehension [at the] trial.”78 But
there is also the intriguing question of whether Riggins' appellate
victory “could be seen as the triumph of a different kind of sanism:
even though the court agreed that the involuntary imposition of
medication violated his fair trial rights, it may be that the justices'
internal, visual images of a person who ‘looked crazy’ inspired the
decision.”79
• To some extent, the case law may create for counsel an intolerable
“Hobson's choice”: if a client is in great psychic pain (with ruinous
hallucinations and delusions), and the lawyer suggests that the client
take medication, that could have an eventual serious (even deadly)
impact on the client.80 The Supreme Court's opinion in Buchanan v.
Kentucky81 certainly more than hints at the potentiality of this
dilemma. More recently, in Riggins, by way of example, Justice
Thomas, in his dissent, argued that, since the defendant had originally
asked for medical assistance (while an inmate, he had “had trouble
sleeping” and was “hearing voices”), it could not be said that the state
75
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ever “ordered” him to take medication.82 Had this position prevailed,
“would concerned and competent defense lawyers feel as if they were
assuming a risk in ever seeking psychiatric help for an awaiting-trial
defendant?”83 This issue is a profound one, self-evidently raising
extraordinarily difﬁcult ethical issues for defense counsel.
6. Conclusion
I self-consciously used the word “dilemmas” in the title of this
paper,84 because I think that these are important dilemmas for the entire
criminal justice system: for the defendants with mental disabilities who
are subject to the court process, for lawyers representing them, for other
players in the trial process, and for the public. There has been a
remarkable explosion of TJ literature in recent years, but painfully little
of it has to do with the questions that I am discussing here. I believe—and
this is an intuition that is shaped to some extent by my 39-year career of
representing and writing about and thinking about criminal defendants
with mental disabilities—that the pervasive sanism of the entire justice
system is, in large part, the reason why little attention has been paid to
this topic.
In the conclusion of my book-length treatment of the insanity defense,
I offered eight recommendations to policymakers as means through
which we could seek to ameliorate the “jurisprudential incoherence” of
that defense.85 The seventh of the eight recommendations was this:
[W]e must rigorously apply therapeutic jurisprudence principles to
each aspect of the insanity defense. We need to take what we learn
from therapeutic jurisprudence to strip away sanist behavior,
pretextual reasoning and teleological decision making from the
insanity defense process. This would enable us to confront the
pretextual use of social science data in an open and meaningful way.86
In that recommendation, I was focusing on the substance of the
defense and the procedures that governed insanity defense trials and
the insanity acquittee retention process. But I believe we must take
my recommendation another step, and apply it to the way that
lawyers represent persons in the insanity and incompetency
processes (and the ways they represent them before the decision is
made to enter into an insanity plea or seek an incompetency
adjudication). If we begin to think about the TJ implications of all of
this, then I think we will be making important progress in an area that
has always remained hidden from the public view.
The title of this paper comes in part from Bob Dylan's song about
artistic and personal commitment.87 Paul Williams argues that, in Up To
Me, Dylan is accepting responsibility for everything on the Blood on the
Tracks album, overt or covert, contrived or genuine.88 A lawyer seeking
to reject sanism and to embrace therapeutic jurisprudence in the
representation of a mentally disabled criminal defense client must do no
less.
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